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Humans have long grappled with the question of the na-
ture of our Self, defined here as the ultimate reality inher-
ent to our individual being. Religious traditions can be a 
great place to look when attempting to understand this 
aspect of our humanity. Broadly speaking, when contem-
plating ideas of Self in Buddhism and Hinduism, the rela-
tionship between the Buddhist notion of Buddha-nature 
(tathāgatagarbha) and the Hindu notion of Self (ātman), is 
an intriguing one: How can we understand them to be 
similar or different? How do the Buddhist concepts of 
emptiness (śūnyatā) and mind-only (cittamātra) relate to 
the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ātman? Is emptiness 
contrary to these ideas? Are tathāgatagarbha and the Hin-
du teaching that ātman is equal to brahman (ultimate re-
ality), both expressions of a non-dualistic state of mind? 
Although it is commonly taught that Hinduism and Bud-
dhism differ in their understanding of Self, one thing that 
becomes apparent is that these are not simple questions, 
perhaps mainly because their answers are contextual. 
There are many answers that come from many different 
types of Hindus and Buddhists in various places. For this 
paper, I will be looking at commentary on the Buddhist 
text the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra and its use of the 
concept of a permanent Self and how this relates to emp-
tiness (śūnyatā) and skillful means (upāya). This paper 
seeks to support my claim that, through skillful means, 
ātman and anātman (no-Self) are both saying something 
quite similar—despite the apparent paradoxical nature 
of this statement—and will look at Buddha-nature in the 
Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra as a way to understand and help 
articulate this thought. 
I would like to make clear at the onset that I do not wish 
to claim an authoritative understanding of these concepts 
for Buddhists and Hindus (or anyone for that matter); 
these observations come from my own context and are 
not meant to speak for the traditions which I am observ-
ing. I am not a Buddhist nor a Hindu but I am intrigued 
by these concepts and wish to better understand myself 
and the worlds from which they come. This brings me 
to a question that has arisen for me during my research: 
why is Buddha-nature and ātman important to consider? 
I believe that the implications of these ideas have very 
tangible consequences in the world and can change how 
we think of concepts such as compassion. They can shape 
the way we contextualize ourselves in the world. 
We must become comfortable with paradox when 
considering these ideas. Ultimately, we are using words 
as a means to an end (that perhaps is not to be thought 
of as an end exactly) that does not necessarily reflect the 
means. In other words, describing states of mind and on-
tology through words in these traditions results in con-
tradiction, because words are limiting boxes that cannot 
completely contain or reflect reality. Yet, is it not these 
contradictions that bring us into a deeper interaction with 
these Buddhist teachings? Externalizing our search for 
understanding with words such as “deeper” help to illus-
trate this tension when looking at Buddha-nature; is there 
a “deeper” or “True” permanent Self, or is there no essen-
tial substantial Self in existence? Perhaps there is both. 
When speaking of the Buddha as seen in the Mahāparinir-
vāṇa sūtra, Paul Williams says, “He has taught Self where 
there is really no-Self, and no-Self where there is really 
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Self. This is not false but skillful means. Here the Bud-
dha-nature is really no-Self, but it is said to be Self in a 
manner of speaking” (99).
The difficulty in using language to describe the ten-
sion between Self and no-Self can be seen in the Nirvāna 
Sūtra (as the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra has been referred to) 
when it asserts that the “core nature of each individual 
is that of a buddha, but mental afflictions (kléa) prevent 
most from realizing it” (Blum, 605). The semantic nature 
of using words such as Self and no-Self could be seen to 
be “mental afflictions” that prevent us from seeing that 
there can be a “core nature” and no core nature at the 
same time. Each of these teachings, Buddha-nature or āt-
man and emptiness or anātman, can steer people towards 
different attachments. When one does not see Buddha-na-
ture it could be that attachment to the idea of an ātman 
could ultimately deter them from realizing their inherent 
Buddha-nature. Yet, this goes both ways; sometimes the 
best way to teach could be to teach of Self, in order to lead 
one in the most beneficial direction. Scholar Takasaki Ji-
kidö reminds us that teachings are a means to liberation, 
“I would emphasize that the follower of the Tathāgatagar-
bha theory would be content with the evaluation of this 
teaching as “conventional,” because any teaching of the 
Buddha is, after all, a convention or means for the sake of 
deliverance or religious awakening” (82). A conventional 
teaching may not reveal the precise ontological distinc-
tions unique to each group of Buddhists that allows a Self 
to exist in a worldview that is empty of Self, but it shows 
that some Buddhists believe in the benefit to teaching 
Self, despite their apparent foundational idea of anātman. 
One does not have to look too far into the traditions 
of Hinduism to see teachings that reflect the Mahāyana 
Buddhist idea of the existence of a core nature and no 
core nature at the same time. When the Mahāparinirvāṇa 
sūtra speaks of our core Buddha-nature and the Hindu 
texts the Upaniṣads speak of ātman, there are parallels be-
tween the two. In the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, there is a sto-
ry about a king who seeks the sound of a lute. The king 
futilely attempts to find the sound in a lute by breaking 
it apart until a minister explains to him that this is not 
the way to get to the sound. In The Doctrine of the Bud-
dha-Nature in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra by 
Ming-Wood Liu, the author explains the themes in this 
story as they relate to Buddha-nature, “The central theme 
of the story is summed up in the concluding declaration 
that the Buddha-nature “abides nowhere,” i.e., is not im-
manent in some form in sentient beings, just as sound is 
not immanent in any part of the lute. In the same manner 
as sound is produced when all necessary conditions are 
satisfied, the Buddha-nature will reveal itself to sentient 
beings when they practice in earnest the way to enlight-
enment prescribed by the tathagata” (Liu, 82). This story 
resonates strongly with one from the Chandogya Upa-
niṇad. In this story, Śvetaketu is being taught by his father 
about the nature of ātman and brahman. The father asks 
Śvetaketu to divide a fig, and then a seed from the fig, and 
when Śvetaketu says that he sees nothing by dividing the 
seed, the father says, as quoted in A Survey of Hinduism, 
“‘My dear, that subtle essence which you do not perceive, 
that is the source of this mighty Nyagrodha tree. That 
which is so tiny is the ātman of all. This is the true, the self, 
that you are, Śvetaketu’” (Klostermaier, 169). Both stories 
could be seen to speak of a self that does not exist inside 
of things, and cannot be found by breaking things down. 
Yet, it is the breaking down of the lute and the fig that aid 
in the acknowledgement of the ideas of ātman and Bud-
dha-nature because there is something else there that has 
yet to reveal itself. The essence that cannot be seen is that 
which is doing the seeing; the unseen seer or ātman and 
buddha womb or tathāgatagarbha, could be understood 
through these stories to be consciousness itself. 
Both Hindus and Buddhists have described our core 
nature, or Self, as an unadulterated state of conscious-
ness. The Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra describes Buddha-nature 
as the pure, inherent element within everyone that is the 
potential for one to attain buddhahood, which could be 
interpreted as to imply that it is consciousness. Later 
sūtras, such as the Śrīmālā sūtra describe tathāgatagarbha 
as “intrinsically pure radiant consciousness (pp. 106–7)” 
(Williams, 102). Ātman is described in the same way. 
According to A Survey of Hinduism, “Ātman is pure con-
sciousness” (Klostermaier, 357). Consciousness is a uni-
versal phenomenon through which a myriad of manifes-
tations has expressed themselves throughout time; it is 
quite possible, from my perspective, that many of the ar-
guments and distinctions between Buddhist conceptions 
of no-Self and Hindu conceptions of Self have been the re-
sult of getting caught up in words because semantics can 
get sticky; words are messy, impermanent, and hold the 
power to nudge towards enlightenment but also confuse 
and separate people. Through the eyes of the Mahāparin-
irvāṇa sūtra, the Buddha did not care enough about the 
doctrine of no-Self to defend it needlessly; when accused 
of nihilism by Hindu Brahmins he responded by affirming 
his teachings as describing a Self. This portrays a value 




for flexibility over rigidity as well as a sense of skillful 
means and a compassionate, enlightened perspective. 
It has been argued in Buddhist sūtras, such as the 
Śrīmālā sūtra, that it takes an enlightened perspective to 
accurately speak of Self in a reality of no-Self. The Śrīmālā 
sūtra states that, “it is difficult to understand the meaning 
of the intrinsically pure consciousness in a condition of 
defilement” (Williams, 102). This seems to be at the crux 
of the apparent issue between ātman, anātman, and Bud-
dha-nature; Buddha-nature is not in the descriptions of 
it, but in the pervasive sound that coalesces from an un-
derstanding free of descriptions. This train of thought—
which is really a kind of no-thought—can be seen to go 
back to the Upaniṣads, as quoted in A Survey of Hinduism, 
“‘This Self cannot be attained by instruction, nor by much 
thought nor by listening to many scripture readings: the 
Self is only attained by one who is chosen: to such a one 
the ātman reveals itself’” (Klostermaier, 172). Much like in 
the story of the king and the lute, Buddha-nature reveals 
itself when one is, in a way, chosen or ready to see that 
which is waiting to be revealed. Hindus and Buddhists 
have both understood the Self in an empty way; the Self 
is revealed when one finds their way out of the endless 
vortex of descriptions that try to describe itself. The Self 
exists within a context of no-Self.
By looking at the story of Yājñavalkya and Gārgī Va-
caknavī in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad one can see how 
Self can exist within a context of no-Self. Through this sto-
ry we can see how the idea of ātman and brahman could 
be seen to exist in emptiness, which could mean that āt-
man does not have to be at odds with anātman. At one 
point, Gārgī questions Yājñavalkya about what the world 
is woven on warp and woof, in other words, what are the 
frame and threads that make up the fabric of our reality. 
Eventually, after going from water, to wind, to creation 
and so on, her questioning arrives at brahman, which she 
also questions, asking for its source as well. Yājñavalk-
ya stops Gārgī’s questioning here saying, “‘Gārgī do not 
question too much lest your head fall off. You are ques-
tioning too much about the divine being, about which 
we are not to question too much” (Klostermaier, 167). To 
me, this story implies that one could keep questioning 
and breaking things down to further realize the extent of 
emptiness, but Yājñavalkya recognizes this as unhelpful. 
Using skillful means, he stops her questioning at brahman; 
this not only affirms that brahman is the level of reality 
that Gārgī (at this juncture in her understanding) should 
be concerned with, but also affirms the ambiguous nature 
of this teaching. The teacher uses skillful means in this 
story to end the questioning mind of someone perhaps 
not ready to contemplate the extent of emptiness. Much 
like the affirmation of mind in Yogācāra Buddhism in 
the face of emptiness, ātman affirms a quality much like 
Buddha-nature in the face of the knowledge that there 
is always more to dissolve under analysis. The question 
becomes what is the use, or skillful means of dissolving 
everything? What is the need or benefit of going beyond 
ātman? If the danger in ātman is attachment to the idea of 
a Self, which is ultimately an illusion or egoistic self, how 
different is it to be attached to the notion of Buddha-na-
ture or anātman? One answer is as follows, “The theories 
of ātman and anātman are both “skilful ways” (upāyah) to 
save ordinary men from errors. Neither ātman nor anāt-
man are the truth” (Ishigami-Iagolnitzer, Mitchiko, 5). My 
interpretation of this quote tells me that we should appre-
ciate the deep ambiguity of these notions and their ability 
to adapt to the needs of the one investigating them.
The Hindu notion of brahman portrays this deep am-
biguity, which is characteristic of the conventional teach-
ings we have explored within Buddhism. Since brahman 
is understood to be beyond even creation itself, it can 
be said that one could conceive of it as a no-thing that is 
empty of our conception of it. The name brahman could 
be understood as a conventional means of explaining 
something beyond words. As quoted in A Survey of Hin-
duism, the Upaniṣads say, “Where words do not reach and 
the mind cannot grasp, there is the brahman full of bliss” 
(Klostermaier, 168). Scholars and Mahāyāna Buddhists 
have recognized the similarity here to Buddha-nature 
thought. “It seems to be a return to the ātman (or Brah-
man), but this Great Self, for Mahāyāna Buddhists, is only 
a conventional name, given to reality void of substance, 
which is Vacuity and Nirvāṇa” (Ishigami-Iagolnitzer, Mit-
chiko, 5). Both traditions are pointing towards a unifying 
substance with no substance; a consciousness free of de-
luded consciousness described by words that are empty 
of ultimate meaning or truth, in order to indicate a such-
ness in nothingness. 
I find it important to note at this point in the paper 
the fact that religious traditions change, and our percep-
tion of them should keep this in mind. Ideas develop as 
time passes and outside influences affect the traditions 
and ideas within them. Buddhism has responded to it-
self and attempted to reconcile seemingly contradictory 
ideas, such as the emptiness described by Madhyama-





and anātman with Buddha-nature. In the lengthy paper 
entitled A Study of Yogācāric Influence on Tathāgatagarbha 
Doctrine as Found in Lahkavatarasūtra, by Mei Hsiao, this 
change is examined in detail:
“Finally, having thoroughly examined tathaga-
ta-nairatmya-garbha in the Lankdvatdrasūtra, it 
was found that the doctrines of tathāgatagar-
bha and pudgala-nairatmya were aligned with 
each other but only under a certain condi-
tion—that is, only when the ātman proposed 
by other religions was denied. However, from 
the viewpoint of the metaphysical aspect of 
the Lankdvatdrasūtra, the tathāgatagarbha can be 
considered to be the genuine Ātman, but one 
which is very different from the absolute an-āt-
man declared in Primitive Buddhism. Actually, 
there is a noticeable inconsistency between the 
views of Primitive Buddhism and the tathāga-
tagarbha tradition” (Hsiao, 69).
While my paper is generally in disagreement with the 
notion that the tathāgatagarbha tradition is inconsistent 
with the anātman of so-called “Primitive Buddhism,” I 
find, as discussed throughout this paper, that through 
the example of the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra one can see how 
these ideas are saying something similar as a form of par-
adox. It is important to make note of the fact that there are 
many ways people have viewed this problem. The focus 
of my paper is not to detail the historical setting that in-
fluenced the development of these ideas; there are many 
social and political factors that have greatly affected the 
development of Buddhism and Buddha-nature and they 
are all important to consider. But, I believe there is a way 
to see a connection between Buddha-nature, ātman, and 
anātman, and a text such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra is a great 
place to observe this train of thought. Hsiao sees this as 
well as a clearly popular trend among later Mahāyāna 
Buddhists, and states that “In the ideological trend of lat-
er Mahāyāna Buddhism, the doctrine of ‘real and eternal 
mind-only’ became all influential and dominant” (Hsiao, 
81). 
When reading through A Study of Yogācāric Influence 
on Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine as Found in Lahkavatarasūtra, 
it became clear that there has been much justification of 
Buddha-nature thought by Buddhists, some that accept 
ātman within their tradition and some that do not. The 
philosophy of ātman was considered by some to be he-
retical, “The compound “tathagata-nairatmya-garbha,” 
according to the context from which it is extracted, aims 
to indicate that the teaching of tathāgatagarbha is entirely 
different from the theory of ātman held by the heretical 
philosophers” (Hsiao, 42). There are many reasons as to 
why this may have been the case and among them could 
be that there is a lot at stake (socially, philosophically, 
politically, and so on) in maintaining the distinction be-
tween Buddhism and Hinduism, which can hinge upon 
the distinction between anātman and ātman. Part of my 
claim, and support for a text such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, is 
that this goes against an understanding of skillful means. 
As a result of acting within the world, these Buddhists 
may be attempting to hold onto their traditions and iden-
tities as forms of attachment (for good, valid reasons 
maybe), but this, perhaps, leads one away from the ide-
als of Buddha-nature. My claim here is not some sort of 
ultimate truth however, and I am in no way saying I am 
righter than Buddhists (and non-Buddhists) who follow 
this thought pattern or that this thought is not valid or 
correct from some perspectives. The world is incredibly 
complex and this is simply an opinion based on my own 
relative understanding. 
Although there may not be one true way to conceive 
of the Self through the lens of Buddhism and Hinduism, 
I believe there is great benefit in placing these ideas with-
in a context of compassion. In the dissertation by Kis-
eong Shin called The Concept of Self and its Implication for 
Salvation in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, when 
discussing the implication of the ideas of self in Advaita 
Vedānta the author states, “Harmony and balance of the 
universe is intrinsic because all things are united together 
in one true self” (Shin, 184). This is certainly one way we 
can take the teachings of ātman and brahman. It is import-
ant to note, however, that historically speaking this is not 
the only way these teachings have been taken. If ātman 
is eternally pure and cannot be defiled then one could 
conclude that death, whether inflicted towards oneself 
or another may not, in a sense, be significant. That be-
ing said, this is not the only necessary conclusion either. 
My point here is that the realization of Self in the form 
of ātman or Buddha-nature is not inherently compassion-
ate. Many times in Hindu mythology yogis receive great 
destructive power from deep realization and as seen in 
the recent conflict in Myanmar, Buddhists are certainly 
capable of violence as well. Yet, conceiving of Self in the 
ways understood through this paper can be an incredibly 
compassionate ideal, as Buddhists have shown through 
their teachings. Shin sees similarities between Buddhist 




and Hindu thought and concludes in one section of the 
paper on Buddhism that, “Compassion is essential in the 
realization of co-origination of everything because ev-
erything is interconnected with everything else. Bowers 
argues that everything in the world is co-originated, and 
self and other are non-differentiated, then ‘loving the oth-
er means loving the self’” (Shin, 187). When considering 
this within my own context, I share the same sensibilities 
and find the careful exploration of these ideas to be a val-
id and thorough way of fostering a compassionate state 
of mind that can directly influence one’s behavior in the 
world. 
Throughout the process of writing and researching for 
this paper, I have found the theory of Buddha-nature as 
Self to be a beautiful idea. Maybe this could be explained 
because I have an attachment to the idea of a Self and 
this is ultimately a hindrance on my own potential path 
to a less deluded realization of reality. Perhaps Self for 
me could be a beneficial convention to deepen my own 
understanding. I stand open to the possibility of aban-
doning my own affinity for a pure, permanent form of (or 
experience of) consciousness that is the nature of one’s 
Self and true reality (that cannot be truly reached through 
language). However at this point, for my personal under-
standing, I prefer to find a similar beauty in the theories 
of Buddha-nature and ātman without saying they are or 
must be considered identical. I find this beauty to be an 
important and valuable thought; one that can help the 
world by helping to invigorate a sense of beauty, accep-
tance, and compassion. 
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